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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




SONIAH ROSE EVANS, 
 












          NO. 43205 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2014-14186 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Evans failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, upon her 
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, by denying her Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence, or by relinquishing jurisdiction? 
 
 
Evans Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Evans pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.91-94.)  Evans filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
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sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.95-96, 103-04.)  Following the period 
of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.110-12.)  
Evans filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.113-16.)   
Evans asserts her sentence is excessive in light of her substance abuse, status 
as a first-time felon, purported acceptance of responsibility, and the “trauma in her life.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.)  The record supports the sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for possession of methamphetamine is seven 
years.  I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of three 
years, with one and one-half years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  
(R., pp.91-94.)  Furthermore, Evans’ sentence is appropriate in light of her conduct prior 
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to sentencing.  Although Evans claimed she accepted responsibility for her criminal 
actions, her statements to the police and the presentence investigator indicated 
otherwise.  After officers arrested Evans in this case in July 2014, she told them the 
methamphetamine and syringes they found in her purse did not belong to her and that 
the “fresh injection marks” on both her arms “were from donating blood every week.”  
(PSI, p.4.1)  Months later, during her presentence interview, Evans continued to deny 
that the illegal items were hers, stating that officers found the methamphetamine and 
syringes “in a case next to [her] purse” and “thought it was [hers] and put it in [her] 
property.”  (PSI, p.5.)  She also maintained that she did not have a substance abuse 
problem, claiming that she only ever used methamphetamine for three months during 
the summer of 2013.  (PSI, p.13.)  Evans told the presentence investigator that she did 
not need substance abuse treatment, and she failed to obtain the court-ordered 
substance abuse evaluation despite the evaluator making several attempts to schedule 
an interview.  (PSI, p.13.)  She also failed to contact the presentence investigator to 
schedule her interview and, when she did go to the interview, she arrived 30 minutes 
late.  (PSI, p.16.)  Additionally, Evans failed to appear for her pretrial conference on 
October 23, 2014, and for her initial sentencing hearing on January 23, 2015, and in 
both instances she was arrested on bench warrants before she again appeared in court.  
(R., pp.4, 6.)   
At sentencing, the district court stated: 
The recommendations by both the PSI and the pretrial settlement 
offer are for the retained jurisdiction.  And while I have a tremendous 
amount of sympathy for the points that you bring up, the difficulty that the 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Cr14-
14186 EVANS #43205 SEALED.pdf.”   
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argument for probation has at this point is that, you know, it was the end of 
July when this occurred, and if you were capable of addressing the issues 
on your own, you had six or seven months to do it, and the last effort was 
a failure to appear at sentencing.   
 
The Court – a lot of people have a lot of difficult times.   A lot of 
people are in the same shoes you’re in and they show up in court and they 
do what they need to do and … maybe they get probation.  There is 
nothing that you have done that would indicate that there’s anything that 
probation – that you deserve it.   
 
For those that do the good work and do the speed work and 
present on the time they have between the charge and the sentencing a 
reason for the Court to say, well, it looks to me like you can do a good 
probation, they get probation.  If I give probation to people that just kind of 




But it seems to me – I agree with the State.  It seems to me that 
this is a situation, something that happened in the last year or two and you 
… fell into the drug scene, and you gotta get out of it, and I think the rider 
is, at this point, the best way to meet the goals of sentencing. 
 
(2/5/15 Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.22.)   
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence.  The sentence imposed is appropriate in light of Evans’ failure to 
accept responsibility for her crime, her refusal to acknowledge that she had a substance 
abuse problem and required substance abuse treatment, and her failure to appear for 
appointments and hearings prior to sentencing.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, 
Evans has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.   
Evans next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying her 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of her continued belief that probation 
would be more appropriate, her claim that she made rehabilitative progress while on her 
rider, her “sound financial situation,” and because she continued to have community 
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support and employment and treatment options.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-10.)  If a 
sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under 
Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
 To prevail on appeal, Evans must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new 
or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 
Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Evans has failed to satisfy her burden.   
Information with respect to Evans’ community support, employment and 
treatment options, and her belief that probation was more appropriate was before the 
district court at the time of sentencing and, as such, was not “new” information 
supporting a reduction of sentence.  (PSI, pp.9, 11, 13-14; 2/5/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.10-22; p.9, 
Ls.13-24; p.12, Ls.15-18; p.13, Ls.10-15; p.14, Ls.13-16.)  Evans’ claim that she 
suddenly had a “sound financial situation” is suspect.  (Appellant’s brief, p.9)  In her 
financial statement filed on July 21, 2014, Evans reported no assets and indicated she 
had no cash on hand or in the bank and that she was receiving public assistance in the 
form of food stamps.  (R., pp.35-36.)  At the time of sentencing in February 2015, Evans 
still reported that she had no assets, she was still receiving food stamps, and she was 
represented by a public defender.  (PSI, pp.13-14; R., pp.39-40, 89.)  At the Rule 35 
hearing, held the following month, Evans was still represented by a public defender but 
suddenly she had $8,400.00 in her savings account.  (3/27/15 Tr., p.5, L.22 – p.6, L.1.)  
Approximately three weeks later, at the rider review hearing, Evans testified that she 
had only $4,000.00 in savings.  (4/16/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-20.)  The massive fluctuations 
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in Evans’ financial situation over very short periods of time do not support her claim of 
financial soundness.   
Evans’ claim that she demonstrated “recovery while on [her] rider” is also highly 
questionable.  According to the APSI, Evans arrived at SBWCC on March 3, 2015, but 
did not begin her rider programming until March 23, 2015.  (PSI, p.25.)  Her Individual 
Program Plan included Relapse Prevention Group (RPG), Moral Reconation Therapy 
(MRT), and Helping Women Recover (HWR).  (PSI, p.25.)  At the time of the hearing on 
her Rule 35 motion, held on March 27, 2015, Evans had attended only one or two 
sessions of MRT, she had attended RPG only once, and she had not yet begun HWR.  
(PSI, pp.25-26.)  Given that Evans later admitted that she had used methamphetamine 
“for a total of 13 months,” including intravenous use (4/16/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.6-18), it is 
extremely doubtful that she achieved recovery after attending only two or three classes 
and being at SBWCC for only three weeks.  At the Rule 35 hearing, the district court 
advised: 
It’s tough to beat a meth addiction.  It’s particularly tough to beat an 
I.V. meth use.  It’s a very compelling thing.  I want you to succeed, and 
that’s the basis of my decision.  I’m going to deny your motion for Rule 35.  
If you do well on your rider program, and the traditional rider is 120 days, 
you’ll have a shot at probation.  You’ll be better equipped to succeed at it.   
 
(3/27/15 Tr., p.13, L.19 – p.14, L.1.)  The district court reasonably denied Evans’ Rule 
35 request to be placed on probation, particularly in light of the fact that the only “new” 
information Evans presented was neither convincing, nor did it show that Evans was 
entitled to a reduction of sentence.  The state submits that by failing to establish her 
sentence was excessive as imposed, Evans has also failed to establish the district court 
abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motion. 
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Finally, Evans asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of her plan for probation and her claims that she “did not fully 
understand the consequences” of signing the refusal to program form and that, despite 
her refusal to program, she “obtained adequate treatment and developed a new, 
positive mindset to be successful on probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12.)  Evans 
has failed to demonstrate that she was an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See 
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984).   
Evans’ claims that she “did not fully understand the consequences” of signing the 
refusal to program form and that she “obtained adequate treatment” while on her rider 
are not supported by the record.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.)  Evans performed poorly 
on her rider and received a recommendation for relinquishment.  (PSI, p.24.)  She failed 
to complete any of her assigned programming, and, in fact, only ever attended two 
sessions of MRT, one session of RPG, and one session of HWR.  (PSI, pp.25-26.)  
SBWCC staff reported, “Although Ms. Evans only received one official corrective action, 
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there were ongoing issues with her aggression and attitude on tier with her peers.  
Three interventions were staged on her behalf however; the end result is that Ms. Evans 
has decided to refuse programming further at this facility.”  (PSI, p.25.)  Program staff 
received numerous concern forms from other offenders indicating that the offenders 
were “afraid of” Evans due to her aggression.  (PSI, pp.30-31.)  Staff noted that Evans 
“uses very defensive and arrogant body language when others are trying to give her 
feedback.  She purses her lips, crosses her arms, and makes derogatory noises.”  (PSI, 
p.30.)   
When her clinician attempted to address issues with Evans, Evans blamed her 
peers, stated that “the other women here are ‘evil’” and that she “wanted to flop her 
program,” and “stormed out of his office.”  (PSI, p.30.)  Evans subsequently had a 
conversation with her case manager, during which she called the clinician a “‘smug son 
of a bitch’ and an ‘asshole.’”  (PSI, p.30.)  Evans stated that she would “not stay [t]here 
any longer,” and when staff advised her “what signing a refusal to program [form] would 
mean,” Evans responded, “‘If that’s what it takes to get out of here fine.’”  (PSI, p.30.)  
She signed the Refusal to Program form on April 1, 2015 – less than one month after 
arriving at SBWCC and only about one week after beginning her programming.  (PSI, 
p.39.)  The refusal form Evans signed specifically stated: 
I Soniah Evans am refusing to participate in the Therapeutic 
Retained Jurisdiction program.  I understand that by signing this form a 
report will be forwarded to the sentencing Court with the recommendation 
of a drop jurisdiction.  I have read and understand the consequences of 
refusing to program. 
 
(PSI, p.30.)  The following day, two different staff members attempted to speak with 
Evans “about giving the program another chance but she [was] abolut[e]ly adamant that 
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she cannot program here and would rather have her time imposed.”  (PSI, p.28.)  As 
such, it is clear that Evans was informed of the consequences of refusing to program 
but chose to sign the refusal form anyway.  Her unwillingness to program and the fact 
that she only ever attended a total of four classes do not support Evans’ argument that 
she obtained adequate treatment.  Moreover, Evans’ abysmal performance in the 
program and ultimate decision that she would rather have her time imposed than 
participate in the programming does not demonstrate that she was an appropriate 
candidate for probation.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Evans has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.     
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Evans’ conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s orders denying Evans’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction 
of sentence and relinquishing jurisdiction. 
       




      _/s/_____________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of December, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      _/s/_____________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
  
